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  This article is mainly concerned with the current reorganization of the Russian oil 
industry. This reorganization is taking place since at least the beginning of the second V. 
Putin’s mandate. Basically, its goal is to increase the state-controlled companies’ 
involvement in the oil upstream activities (Gazprom and Rosneft). This reorganization 
takes two forms. The first one is quite informal. It consists in some discretionary 
interventions by the State to reassign oil licences and assets
1. More formal, the second 
one is the amendments to the Subsoil Law which are currently discussed. Among 
important issues is the project to limit private firm’s access to strategic fields and give 
state-controlled companies a privileged right to obtain licenses’ stakes
2. Then, it is 
observed an important change in the way the Russian State wants to regulate the 
transaction by which he opens its upstream oil to private companies. The objective of this 
article is twofold. Firstly, we address the reasons of this reorganization. Second, we adopt 
a more normative perspective and raise the question of the relevance of the way this 
reorganization takes place. 
 
  Regarding the Russian oil industry reorganization, some authors stress two 
complementary points of view. First, the interventionist tendency from the Russian 
authorities cannot be seen as a coherent oil policy
3. This move can only be explained by a 
                                                 
1 G. Collins presents a quite recent synthesis of these reassignments. G. Collins (2006), “With National Oil 
Companies, Russia Seeking Control Plus Capital”, Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 104.19, pp. 18-22. 
 
2 L. Skyner (2005), “The Regulation of Subsoil Resource Usage. The Erosion of the “Two-Key” Principle 
and its Inclusion into the Framework of the Civil Law”, Review of Central and East-European Law, n.2-4, 
pp.127-157. The Moscow Times, “Trutnev Sees No Subsoil Law Before ’08”, The Moscow Times, 
31/08/07, p. 5. 
 
3 This idea is defended by V. Milov, the current director of the Russian Energy Institute.  L. Coburn, I. 
Danchenko & V. Milov (2006), “Russia’s Energy Policy, 1992-2005”, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, Vol. 47, n. 3, pp. 386-405. Among the reactions involved by this article, few authors contest 
the negative consequences of the state interventionism. See M. Sagers (2006), “Russia’s Energy Policy: A 
Divergent View”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 47, n. 3, pp. 314-320, A. Åslund (2006), 
“Russia’s Energy Policy: A Framing Comment”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 47, n. 3, pp. 
321-328. 
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regression toward a “central planning mentality”
4 from the Russian authorities’ part. It is 
currently observed a re-nationalisation of oil assets and political short-term interests are 
stressed as an explanation for this regression. Second, this interventionism must be 
considered as the main obstacle the Russia’s oil industry will encounter to sustain the 
current level of production. While the organization model which has emerged from the 
privatization program has been successful in increasing the level of oil production, state 
interventionism is likely to put an end to this growth. According to this point of view, the 




Conversely to these ideas, this article aims at highlighting that the current 
reorganisation cannot be seen as a mere re-nationalisation of oil assets. In our opinion, 
the main objective of the Russian state remains to delegate the exploration-production 
activities to private companies for a large part. However, what we will call the 
“unexpected results” of the Russia’s oil industry privatization lead the state to impose the 
presence of a state-controlled company beside private ones. Mainly, these “unexpected 
results” lie in the short-term strategies implemented by Russian private oil companies. 
While they maximize the production from “old” fields, those bring in production or 
explored during the soviet period, they are ignoring investments in exploration. These 
features are likely to explain the impressive growth of Russian oil production as well as 
the inhability of this country to replenish its resources. Therefore, we will be more 
measured than V. Milov in assessing the apparently success of the Russian model which 
has emerged from the privatization process
6. Well then, according to the tenant of a rapid 
privatization of oil assets, this process should have led companies to implement a more 
balance resource management. Interested by the future value of their assets, the new 
owners were supposed to invest in oil exploration. Here, we will try to explain these 
“unexpected results” by stressing the ineffectiveness of economic institutions, mainly 
private property rights on oil assets and oil contracts
7. This ineffectiveness is likely to 
explain the short term strategies implemented by oil companies in Russia. Afterwards, in 
                                                 
4 L. Coburn, I. Danchenko & V. Milov (2006), Op. cit., p. 312. 
 
5 After an impressive decline during the first years of transition, it is observed an important growth of the 
Russia’s oil production since 1998. However, the growth rate is decreasing since 2005. According to the 
“Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of up to 2020” which is supposed to guide the Russian energy 
policy, the current management policy of resources could lead to a strong reduction in production level, 
from 9.6 Mb/j to 6,3 Mb/J in 2020. The Ministry of Natural Resources points out a production level of 5 
Mb/J in 2020. For an overview of different scenario regarding Russian oil production, see : S. Boussena & 
C. Locatelli (2004), « Vers une plus grande cohérence de la politique pétrolière de la Russie ? », Revue de 
l’énergie, n°560, p. 507. 
 
6 Here, we follow V. Kryukov & A. Moe (2006),”Resource Abundance and Reserve Scarcity”, Paper for 
Presentation at 29
th IAEE International Conference, Postdam 7-10 June 2006, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute 
and L. Dienes (2004), “Observations on the problematic Potential of Russian Oil and the Complexities of 
Siberia”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 45, n. 5, pp. 319-345. 
 
7 For a presentation of the objectives assigned to the process of privatization and an overview of its 
“unexpected results”, see D. Finon & C. Locatelli (2003), « L’échec de l’introduction d’institutions de 
marché dans une économie en transition. Les limites du consensus de Washington dans un secteur de 
rente », Cahier de recherche LEPII-EPE, n°33.   3
order to understand these institutions’ ineffectiveness, we will turn to the ideas of 
institutional complementarity and institutional incoherence developed by the New 
Institutional Economy (NIE). Basically, new institutionalist economists stress the links 
which exist between institutions. An institution’s efficiency and effectiveness cannot be 
assessing independently of the institutional environment into which it is implemented. 
Regarding the specificities of the transaction by which the State opens its oil upstream on 
one hand, and those of the Russian environment on the other hand, it is argued that the 
privatization program was an institutional incoherence. Private property rights on oil 
assets and oil contracts cannot be effective. Finally, we stress that under some restrictive 
conditions the imposition of a state-controlled company beside private companies could 
be an institutional arrangement likely to put an end to this institutional incoherence.  
 
To support this last idea, four main points are worth to consider. First of all, it is 
stressed the current ineffectiveness of market institutions in the Russian oil industry. The 
second point deals with the idea of institutional complementarity. This idea is used to 
build a classification of oil models and to highlight the incoherence of the Russian one. 
The market institution, mainly private property rights and oil contract cannot be effective. 
The short term strategies implemented by the Russian oil companies appears to be a 
response to this incoherence. Therefore, the point to consider lies in the way the Russian 
authorities could change the incentives faced by private companies. How the Russian 
authorities could be able to enforce market institutions? For answering this question, it is 
carry out a comparative analysis of contractual arrangements likely to improve the 
incentives faced by private companies. Through this analysis, it will be show that “good” 
contractual arrangements, those improving the incentives faced by private companies, 
involve high control costs borne by the state. Here lies the main argument in favour of 
our thesis. The imposition of a State-controlled company beside private ones is likely to 
diminish the control costs borne by the State. It could be a complementary institutional 
arrangement allowing the enforcement of oil contracts. Afterwards, the last point try to 
address the question of the way the Russian state could control its national oil companies.    
 
 
I.  The Ineffectiveness of Market Institutions in the Russian Oil Industry 
 
“Market institutions” is a quite broad concept. In parallel, the perception of their role 
and their functionality in economy is a hot topic among the theories which share the basic 
point that “institutions do matter”
8. Among these theories, the New Institutional 
Economics appears as the one which is the most followed. The specificity of the NEI lies 
in the functionality role which is attributed to institutions. Property rights and contracts 
are seen as essential for facilitating private transactions and cooperative behaviour (A). 
Despite the formal definition of private property rights over oil assets and oil contracts 
managing the openness of Russian oil upstream, these institutions do not ensure their 
                                                 
8 This diversity of view clearly appears in works which aim at giving an overview of economics thought 
regarding institutions’ role in economy. See for example M. Rutherford (1996), Institutions in Economics. 
The Old and the New Institutionalism, Cambridge University Press and T. Eggertsson (1990), Economic 
Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
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functional role. They do not allow cooperative behaviour between the state and private 
companies (B).  
 
A.  The NIE Perspective of Economic Institutions 
 
It is possible to find two definitions of institutions into the NEI. Each one allows 
highlighting different functional roles attributed to institution by the NEI. The first and 
the most usual is the D. C. North’s definition. This author sees economic institutions as 
“the rule of the game of a society (…) the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), 
informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of 
conduct)”
9.  According to the authors sharing this point of view, the functional role of 
institutions is twofold. First, institutions allow the decreasing of uncertainty which is 
faced by individuals. Regarding this uncertainty, NIE stresses that the most pregnant one 
lies in what D.C. North calls the uncertainty of “human environment”. Agents cannot 
anticipate other agents’ actions. Then, this uncertainty can inhibit individuals. Agents 
could be reluctant to engage themselves on quite uncertain production and exchange 
activities. Therefore, by constraining the choice of each individual, the rules of the game 
allow a decrease of this uncertainty. That’s why institutions can be viewed as the 
determinant of economic performance. Institutions determine the level of production and 
exchange in economy for a large part. The second functional role of institutions is that 
they define “the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies.
10” In this 
respect, the property rights approach is the one which insists the most on this dimension. 
Its main objective is to show that property rights structure on assets affect use of 
resources in “specific and predictable ways.
11” Advocates of this approach stress that 
property rights structures on assets influences owners’ incentives and behaviors
12. For an 
owner to be incited to use efficiently his asset its property rights must not be attenuated, 
i.e. he must possess: 
i)  the right to use the asset ; 
ii)  the right to sell, transfer the asset ; 
iii)  the right to receive the residual profit. 
As point out by L. J. Alston and B. Mueller, “The more exclusive are property rights to 
the individual or group the greater the incentive to maintain the value of the asset (…) 
                                                 
9 D. C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
 
10 D. C: North (1990), Op. cit. 
 
11 E. G. Furubotn & S. Pejovich (1972), “Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent 
Literature”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. X, n. 4, p. 1139. 
 
12 A quite complete synthesis of all issues raised and adressed by the property rights approach is furnished 
by Y. Barzel. Y. Barzel (1997), Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Seconde Edition, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
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The second definition of institutions found in NEI works is the one put out by the 
transaction costs economics (TCE) branch. Articles by R. C. Coase and by O. E. 
Williamson are seminal works of the TCE
14. Economic institutions are viewed as the 
modes of organization, the governance structures, specified by agents for managing their 
transactions. These private-order rules are essential for agents to protect themselves 
against opportunism of their partner. According to Williamson, this behavioral 
assumption extends the mere self-interest seeking assumption to include "self-interest 
seeking with guile"
15. Opportunism “manifests itself as adverse selection, moral hazard, 
shirking, subgoal pursuit, and other forms of strategic behavior”
16. By relying to this 
behavioral assumption, new institutional economists are concerned with all negative 
consequences which are likely to happen because of asymmetries of information. 
Compared to other economics theories dealing with this problem, NIE refuses to consider 
possible the implementation of optimal contracts. The reason lies in the second 
behavioral assumption made by new institutional economists: bounded rationality
17. 
Aiming at stressing the limited cognitive capacity of agents, this assumption induces the 
impossibility for agents to deal with all their conflicts of interest at the time of the 
transaction. Necessarily, contracts are incomplete
18. While recognizing the importance of 
ex ante contractual devices, TCE highlights that governance structures regulating 
transactions have mainly for objective to control ex post opportunism. 
 
These two definitions of institutions found in NEI lead us to follow O. E. Williamson 
when he stresses that NIE is concerned with two main research matters: formal and 
informal rules of a country and governance structures specified by agents to manage their 
                                                 
13 L. J. Alston and B. Mueller (2005), “Property Rights and the State”, in C. Ménard and M. M. Shirley 
(eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Springer, The Netherlands, p. 574. 
 
14 Of course, the concept of transaction costs has been introduced by R. C. Coase in economics. We will 
refer here to the definition which is given by O. E. Williamson: each transaction involves costs of 
“planning, adapting and monitoring tasks”. O. E. Williamson (1994), Les institutions de l’économie, 
InterEditions, Paris, p. 20. 
 
15 O. E. Williamson (1994), Op. Cit., p. 20. 
 
16 O. E. Williamson (2000), “The New Institutional economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 601. 
 
17 The concept of bounded rationality is introduced by H. Simon. Here, no differences will be made 
between bounded rationality and procedural rationality also introduced by H. Simon. See H. Simon (1976), 
“From Substantive to Procedural Rationality”, in S. Latsis [Eds], Method and Appraisal in Economics, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 129-148. 
 
18 Basically, here lies the specificity of the TCE comparing to other theories of contracts in economics, that 
is to say Incomplete Contract Theory and Incentive Theories. E. Brousseau & J-M Glachant [ed.] (2002), 
The Economics of Contracts. Theories and Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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transactions
19. Despite this difficulty to find a common definition, two assumptions 
relative to agents’ behavior give to the NIE its identity and its homogeneity. The first one 
is bounded rationality. Two consequences are induced by this assumption. First, agents 
take decisions in an uncertain environment, according to the distinction made by 
Knight
20. Social rules are needed to decrease this uncertainty and allow productive 
activities to take place. Second, contracts are incomplete. The second common 
assumption which unifies NIE works lies in the opportunism of agents. Because of that, 
social and private-order rules are essential for allowing transactions to take place despite 
asymmetries of information. 
 
Therefore, an NIE perspective of institutions focuses on the functionality role of 
economic institutions. Social and private-order rules ensure the following role: 
i)  To decrease uncertainty and agents’ inhibition; 
ii)  to incite owners to use efficiently their assets; 
iii)  to overcome obstacles to transactions induce by informational 




B.  The Ineffectiveness of Economic Institutions in the Russian Oil Industry  
 
 
Despite a formal specification of private property rights on oil assets and a quite 
detailed legal framework regulating private companies’ activities in Russian oil upstream, 
economic institutions do not currently ensure their functional roles. In order to defend 
this point of view, three observations are worth to highlight. The first lies in the 
characterisation of Russian oil companies’ strategies. It seems possible to show that these 
strategies are those of private actors facing a total uncertainty. Standard economics works 
dealing with management of a non-renewable resource stress the decisive role of the 
discount rate chose by an operator. This rate will determine its strategy regarding 
extraction and investment
21. The discount rate reveals companies’ preference for the 
                                                 
19 O. E. Williamson (2000), Op. Cit. 
 
20 Knight points out two ways for dealing with the future in economics: either we consider a risky 
environment, as neoclassical economics does, or we consider an uncertain environment. The main 
difference which is important to have in mind is the following: while agents are supposed to know all the 
events which are likely to happen when they face a risky environment, this is not the case if they are facing 
an uncertain environment. They do not even know which events are likely to occur. The main analytical 
consequence of this distinction lies in the fact that it is not possible to consider agents’ decisions as a result 
of a maximization calculation. N. Moureau & D. Rivaud-Danset (2004), L’incertitude dans les theories 
économiques, Ed. La découverte, Collection repères. 
 
21 M. A. Adelman (1990), “Mineral Depletion with Special Reference to Petroleum”, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 7, n.1, pp. 1-10.  T. Besley uses Adelman’s model to stress the results of an 
uncertainty over property rights upon the depletion rate choose by agents. Uncertainty over property rights 
is likely to increase agent’s discount rate. According to T. Besley, while it is quite clear that this increase 
leads to lower investments carry on for exploration, how this increase affects the time path of depletion rate 
remains an open question. While a higher discount rate raises the premium on near-term revenues, it also   7
present time, the rate they use to value resources on the ground. Then it can be considered 
as a good indicator of the uncertainty faced by oil companies. Russian oil companies’ 
strategies regarding resources management clearly indicate a high discount rate. They are 
reluctant to invest in risky exploration works and their depletion rate of known reserves is 
quite high
22. These strategies catch the high uncertainty toward the future faced by 
Russian oil companies. That is why we can consider that private property rights on oil 
assets do not ensure a decrease of the uncertainty faced by private oil companies
23. More, 
private property rights do not induce owners to manage efficiently their assets. Sooner or 
later, Russian oil assets’ value will be negatively and strongly affected by these short run 
strategies.   
 
Two other observations can be made. They stress the current ineffectiveness of oil 
contracts. Formal rules regulating the openness of Russian oil upstream do not ensure 
their functional roles. At the present time, opportunist behaviours from the two partners 
are observed. A look at the oil projects’ benefits sharing highlights this point. It is largely 
recognized that the Russian authorities encounter difficulties to effectively tax Russian 
oil companies’ profits. This is mainly due to the asymmetries of information which exist 
in favour of private companies. These asymmetries concern production costs and sells 
prices. Regarding this point, it is worth to stress the work realized by the World Bank for 
assessing the scale of the transfer pricing mechanism
24. This 2004 study aims at re-
calculate the Russian GDP by eliminating problems induced by transfer pricing 
mechanism. According to this study, the hydrocarbon sector share in the Russian GDP 
puts up from 8,8% according to official statistics to 25%
25. Then, Russian authorities 
cannot control effectively profits’ oil companies. These latter can benefit from their 
private informations about production costs and sell prices for an effective fiscal evasion. 
The second observation is concerned with the opportunist behaviour from the Russian 
                                                                                                                                                 
raises the opportunity cost of investment to obtain those resources. Then, a higher discount rate has an 
ambiguous effect on depletion rate. A Russian oil industry’s feature leads us to consider that a higher 
discount rate induces a higher depletion rate. This feature is the fact that Russian oil companies became the 
operator of fields explored and bring into production during the Soviet period. Then, their opportunity costs 
to obtain resources are low. T. Besley (1995), “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and 
Evidence from Ghana”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 103, n.5, pp. 903-937.  
 
22 Since 1999, the Russian oil output increase is mainly due to some specific investments for enhancing oil 
recovery from “old” deposits. These investments have not been followed by investments for the exploration 
of new fields in remote areas like Eastern Siberia. This explains why Russia cannot ensure the 
replenishment of its reserves despite a huge resources base. Regarding this, some observers talk about a 
“predatory management of resources”. International Energy Agency (2002), Russia Energy Survey, 
IEA/OECD, Paris; L. Dienes (2004), Op. cit.; V. Kruykov & A. Moe (2006), Op. cit.  
 
23 This point is made by C. G. Gaddy and B. W. Ickes (2005), “Resource Rents and the Russian Economy”, 
Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 46, n.8, pp. 559-583.  
 
24 This mechanism allows Russian oil companies to decrease their fiscal obligations. The holding sells its 
crude to some subsidiaries registered in a fiscal heaven at a price well below the market price. Then, 
holdings’ profits are automatically decreased as well as fiscal obligations if taxes are based on profit. 
  
25 World Bank (2004), Russian Economic Report, n. 7, World Bank, Washington, p. 6. 
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authorities. This opportunism manifests itself by some discretionary interventions of the 
Federal authorities, withdrawing licenses, re-defining contractual arrangements, 
especially fiscal ones and so on
26. It is worth to note that the term discretionary does not 
mean that the Russian authorities in not complicit with oil legislation. Rather, this term is 
used to highlight the selective application of this law
27.  
 
  The objective of this first part was to stress that a neo-institutional perspective of 
economic institutions focuses on the functional role of institutions. Social rules are 
essential to decrease uncertainty and induce private actors to engage themselves in 
productive and exchange activities. More, private-order rules are necessary for the agents 
to protect themselves against opportunism. Despite some formal rules specifying private 
property rights on oil assets and a quite extend legal framework regulating upstream 
activities, institutions are not effective in the Russian oil industry. Short term strategies 
implemented by private oil companies show the ineffectiveness of private property rights 
on oil assets. More, opportunist behaviour is the dominant strategy implemented by the 
two partners.  
 
 
II.  Institutional Complementarities and the Incoherence of the Current 
Russian Oil Model 
 
Once stressed the ineffectiveness of institutions, we can turned to the idea of 
intitutional complementarity developed by the NIE (A) for addressing the reasons of this 
ineffectiveness (B). 
 
A.  One View of the Institutional Complementarity  
 
New institutional economists put out the idea of an institutional complementarity. 
There exist some links and interdependencies between institutions. Their basic point is 
quite simple. Each institution’s efficiency and effectiveness depend on the way this 
institution is articulated with institutions which already are in place. Two direct 
implications can be stressed. First, there is no optimal institution which could in itself 
deals with coordination problems at stake. Each institution, each contractual arrangement, 
have to be assessed on the basis of its own strengths and weaknesses on one hand, and on 
the basis of the way they articulates with other institutions on the other hand. Second, it 
appears relevant to lead comparative analyses of institutions. These studies aim at 
bringing to light what are the institutions which allow a specific arrangement to be 
effective. In a more dynamic perspective, these studies aim at addressing the 
                                                 
26 Tax legislation in Russia is known as one of the most complicate and unstable comparing to international 
standard.  
 
27 For example, the threat to withdraw the Kovykta license hold by TNK-BP for underproduction has been 
used by the Federal authorities for inducing TNK-BP to negotiate Gazprom’s arrival. This is quite coherent 
regarding the license terms. However, almost all licenses could be revoked according to these criteria. 
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What we will call the “Standard approach” of institutional complementarity is 
presented by O. E. Williamson in his 2000 article. According to this author, the 
institutional environment of a country must be considered as the institutions 
hierarchically first. This means that political and legal institutions limit the possibilities to 
make economic institutions effective. Property rights are social rules specified and 
enforced by the state. The state appears as the legitimate authority allowing the 
emergence of the Rule of Law. This term indicates a legal environment where property 
rights are protected. They are not attenuated by the state or by other agent’s actions. It 
can be easily understood that the independence of judicial authorities or the form of 
government are some essential features allowing or preventing the emergence of the Rule 
of Law.  
 
  Regarding the effectiveness of governance structures chose by agents for 
regulating their transactions, the standard approach also considers that the institutional 
environment is hierarchically first. This point is more explicit in B. Levy and P. T. 
Spiller’s works than in O. E. Williamson’s one. These two authors lead a comparative 
study of governance structures implemented in different countries to regulate the 
telecommunication sector
29. Their main conclusion is that relative efficiency of these 
governance structures must be re-assessed by taking into account the institutional 
environment of the country in which they are implemented. Governance structures which 
were supposed to be efficient for giving operators some incentives to invest appear to be 
ineffective. The main reason is that these structures of governance are not coherent with 
the institutional environment’s characteristics. Conversely, contractual arrangements 
supposed inefficient appear to be quite effective. This is because they are aligned with 
some features of the country’s intitutional environment.  
 
  This standard approach of institutional complementarity is used by some authors 
to explain the ineffectiveness of economic institutions in Russia, notably in the oil 
sector
30. First, it is stressed than political and judicial institutions put an important barrier 
to the emergence of the Rule of Law. More precisely, the scale of corruption in Russian 
administration cannot ensure the protection of private property rights against attenuations 
                                                 
28 C. Ménard (2000), “Methodological Issues in New Institutional Economics”, Analyse Théorique des 
Organisations et des Marchés. Downloaded on the ATOM’s website, 10/09/2006: http://atom.univ-
paris1.fr/documents/M_nard_2001c_Methodological_Issues.pdf
 
29 B. Levy & P. T. Spiller (1994), “The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A 
Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 
Vol. 10, n°2, pp.201-246. 
 
30 Without refering to NIE theoretical framework, W. Tompson is the author who is the most convincing 
when he stresses the importance of the Russian institutional environment for explaining the current actions 
of the Federal authorities in the oil sector. W. Tompson (2006), « Un Venezuela du froid ? La malédiction 
des ressources et la politique russe », Politique étrangère, Vol. 1, pp. 37-50. 
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from state agent’s part on the one hand, and from other private agents’ part on the 
other
31. More, some features of the Russian governance structure regulating oil upstream 
activities cannot ensure a good alignment with the Russian institutional environment. We 
cannot underestimate this point. For example, it can be considered as an institutional 
incoherence the choice made by Russian authorities to regulate upstream activities via the 
license mechanism. Exploration and production licences are administrative permits. For a 
large part, their effectiveness depends upon the delegation of an important discretionary 
power to oil administration for issuing licenses, supervising their applications and 
revoking them. That way, a corrupt administration or the difficulties for the Federal 
authorities to control regional administrations are some barriers to this mechanism’s 
effectiveness. These characteristics of the Russian environment could not ensure the 
effectiveness of the license mechanism
32.  
 
  Then, according to the “Standard Approach” of institutional complementarity, the 
main explanation of the current ineffectiveness of economic institutions lies in the 
Russian institutional environment. This latter prevents the emergence of the rule of law 
and the effectiveness of the governance structure. Regarding the current reorganization of 
the Russian oil industry, this point of view stresses another explanation than the 
regression toward a “central planning mentality” from the Russian authorities. The 
delegation of upstream oil activites to state-controlled companies is the default mode of 
organization, the only feasible alternative regarding the Russian institutional 
environment. This positive conclusion can nevertheless be criticized. This is because of 
the theoretical inconsistency of the “standard approach”.  
  
  These inconsistencies are stressed by G. M. Hodgson and J. Sapir, notably
33. The 
first one lies in the contradiction between the individualism methodological that O. E. 
Williamson is referring to, on one hand, and the way social institutions are supposed to 
influence agents’ preferences and interests, on the other hand. While O. E. Williamson 
wants to explain the emergence of institutions, the emergence of governance structures, 
by relying on individualism methodological, it is stressed implicitly in its 2000 article 
that social institutions influence agents’ preferences and interests. Then, it appears 
necessary to make explicit this point by abandoning individualism methodological. 
Agent’s interests are not pre-existent to choices and they are influenced by social rules in 
which decisions take place. As put out by B. Amable, “agent’s strategies are conceived 
                                                 
31 T.  Frye (2004), “Credible Commitment and Property Rights. Evidence From Russia”, Ohio State 




32 G. Cordero Moss (1998), “Contract or License? Regulation of Petroleum Investments in Russia and the 
Role of Foreign legal Advice”, Centre for Energy, Petroleum, and Mineral Law and Policy, Vol. 3, n. 11. 
Downloaded on the CEPMLP’s website, 06/02/2006: 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol3/vol3-11.html
 
33 See G. M. Hodgson (1993), “Institutional Economics: Surveying the Old and the New”, 
Matroeconomica, Vol. 44, n. 1, pp. 1-28 and J. Sapir (2005), Quelle économie pour le XXIième siècle ?, 
Odile Jacob, Paris. 
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under the influence of institutions, that is to say the formal and informal rules which 
define the set of choices.
34” More, social institutions do not influence choices and 
interests independently. Here lies one of the main important links between institutions. 
Each rule influences agents’ interests and incentives. Therefore, the effect of a particular 
rule upon agents’ behaviour cannot be assessed independently from the effects induce by 
other rules.  This last point is important for our subject. Indeed, it must be stressed that 
property rights on oil assets and property rights on oil resources both influence agents’ 
interests. As it will be make clear later, here lies a specificity of the transaction by which 
a state opens its oil upstream to private operators.  
 
  The second incoherence lies in the contradiction existing between the bounded 
rationality assumption, on one hand, and the way agents are supposed to determine their 
strategies, on the other hand. According to the standard approach developed by O. E. 
Williamson, agents are supposed to choose governance structures for minimizing 
transactions costs. In a way, this means that governance structures are an outcome of a 
maximization calculation. It is in contradiction with the bounded rationality assumption 
on which O. E. Williamson relies. More, opportunism’s theory put by O. E. Williamson 
implicitly rely on the assumption that agents are able to assess all gains and losses of a 
defection strategy. They are supposed able to maximize their utility in a dynamic 
perspective. These two features of the way agents are supposed to choose their strategies 
are in contradiction with the bounded rationality assumption. Indeed, these features 
require that agents are perfectly rational. They maximize their expected utility on a basis 
of an intertemporel calcul. However, if perfect rationality is accepted, social institutions 
are inconsequent form a NEI perspective. Indeed, social institutions are worth to analyze 
only if agents face a bounded rationality resulting from the uncertain environment in 
which they take their decision. We can see here that the standard approach of the 
institutional complementarity is based upon some strong inconsistencies. 
 
  In order to overcome these inconsistencies, it appears necessary to accept all 
analytical consequences of the bounded rationality assumption. First, that means that we 
have to suppose that social institutions influence for a large part agents’ interests and 
preferences. Second, agents will define their strategies regarding opportunism according 
to their subjective beliefs concerning their interests. In this perspective, we will rely here 
on NIE works which consider institutions as equilibrium phenomena. Some authors as M. 
Aoki and A. Greif consider institutions in a game theoretic perspective. Institutions are 
outcomes of a subjective game played between agents
35. The concept of “subjective 
game” means that players are supposed “to have individual, incomplete cognitive views 
regarding the structure of the game they play.
36” Formal law and formal contracts cannot 
                                                 
34 B. Amable (2005), Les cinq capitalismes. Diversité des systèmes économiques et sociaux dans la 
mondialisation, Edition du Seuil, Paris, p. 49. 
 
35 See M. Aoki (2001), Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, MIT,  and   A. Greif (1998), “Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis”, American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 88, n.2, pp. 80-84. 
 
36 M. Aoki (2001), Op. Cit. 
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be seen as themselves as institutions. These laws are just the rules of the game and 
institutions are the results of this game. Each agent chooses his strategy according to his 
beliefs regarding its interest, on one hand, and his beliefs regarding other agents’ interests 
on the other hand.  Then, it seems to us that this approach of institutions allows 
overcoming theoretical inconsistencies of the “standard approach”. Each social rule 
influence agents’ interests. More, agents really face a bounded rationality. They 
implement their strategies by relying on their subjective beliefs.  
 
Beside the importance of beliefs, the second feature of this approach of institution 
lies in the idea of self-enforcement. As institutions are an equilibrium outcome of the 
game in which each player choose his best strategy according to his beliefs, institutions 
can be considered as self-enforceable. Here lies another reason to rely on this approach of 
institutional complementarity. Indeed, this approach stresses the need to include into the 
game the enforcer of institutions, i.e. the state. We need to address the question of the 
state’s motivations to really enforce institutions. Concerning the transaction analyzed 
here, this need is strengthen since the state is at the same time a contractor and the 
enforcer. Then, the theoretical inconsistencies of the standard approach and the 
specificity of the transaction justify that we rely on this game theoretical approach of 
institutions.  
 
This approach of institutions will be used here to bring to light the main links and 
interdependencies between property rights on oil assets, property rights on oil resources 
and oil contracts. Methodologically, we consider here that state’s interests regarding the 
use of its oil resources are hierarchically first. That means that these interests limit the 
possibilities to make private property rights on oil assets, on the one hand, and oil 
contracts, on the other hand effective. This can be justified by the double status of the 
state. Compared to the “standard approach”, institutional environment is not 
hierarchically first. However, this does not mean that the institutional environment’s 
features have no consequences upon the enforceability of institutions. For example, a 
weak administrative capacity can influence agents’ beliefs regarding the ability of the 
state to enforce formal rules. Then, it can influence agents’ interests and consequently 
their strategies.  
 
B.  The diversity of Oil Models and the incoherence of the Russian Oil Privatization 
 
By considering state’s interests regarding the use of its oil resources as 
hierarchically first, we can highlight three generic oil models. Each model is 
characterized by the form took by the property rights on oil resources, on one hand, and 
property rights on oil assets on the other hand. Following B. Mommer, we consider two 
types of oil states: those implementing a proprietorial regime and those implementing a 
liberal regime
37.  According to this author, the main difference between these two types 
of regime lies in the fiscal system. While liberal regime is featured by a system which 
aim at levy a tax on oil rent, a proprietorial one consider that oil resources present a value 
underground. Then, a proprietorial fiscal system is featured by some devices taxing the 
                                                 
37 B. Mommer (2002), Global Oil and the Nation State, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford. 
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volume of production. A royalty based on production volume which must be paid by 
operators is the most striking example of a proprietorial fiscal device. Here, we consider 
two more differences. The first one lies in the fact that a proprietorial state wants to make 
effective its property rights on oil resources. The state wants to control the depletion rate 
of its oil resources. Conversely, a liberal state let private companies explore and extract 
oil resources according to their own rationality. The second difference is a complement of 
the first one. A proprietorial state does not intend to conform to international law for 
managing an eventual conflict with private companies. 
 
This simple classification of oil states leads us to consider three types of oil 
model. The first one can be called the “coherent proprietorial model”; basically, it is the 
model implemented in OPEC’s counties. In order to make effective its property rights on 
oil resources, the state close its oil upstream to private operators. That’s why, it is a 
coherent model. The second one is the “liberal model”. Here, the UK appears to be the 
striking example. While the upstream activities are delegated to private companies, the 
state lets the companies extract the resources according to their own rationality. The state 
does not really make effective its property rights on oil resources. The third model can be 
called the “incoherent proprietorial regime”. Surely it is the most widespread model. 
This model is based upon an institutional incoherence. While the state wants to make 
effective its property rights on oil resources, upstream activities are delegated to private 
companies. But private property rights on oil assets cannot be self-enforcing. They are 
necessarily attenuated. Indeed, as the state wants to control the depletion rate of 
resources, the operators’ right to use the asset is attenuated. Private companies’ beliefs 
are that it is not the interest of the State to protect this right. More, private companies’ 
right to access oil resources is also attenuated. First, this access is allowed through a lease 
system. The length of the lease is necessary finite. And, as stressed by R. Boadway & F. 
Flatters, “only a lease of indefinite duration would be equivalent to full private ownership 
of the resource property.
38” Second, as the State do not comply with international law, 
private rights to resource access are also uncertain. Then, this last model is based on an 
institutional incoherence. Whatever the institutional environment of a country, private 
property rights on oil assets cannot ensure their functional role to decrease uncertainty 
and give private companies good incentives to use oil resources. 
 
  At the present time, Russian oil model belongs to the “incoherent proprietorial 
model”. Here lies the first incoherence of the Russian oil industry privatization program. 
Private property rights are attenuated and access to oil resources remains uncertain from 
the Russian private companies’ point of view. In accordance with the view of institutional 
complementarity adopted here, this institutional incoherence can have a consequence 
upon the strategies of opportunism implemented by agents. In this respect, one can argue 
that the companies and the sate have interests to negotiate and respect their mutual 
commitments. Private companies could be incited to respect state’s interests in 
implementing their depletion strategies and sharing benefits’ project. In turn, state’s 
commitment to protect their property right on assets and their access to oil resources 
could become credible from private companies’ point of view. However, the conditions 
                                                 
38 R. Boadway & F. Flatters (1993), Op. cit. p. 5.  
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for the cooperative equilibrium to emerge are quite restrictive
39. Two features of the 
present transaction could influence agents to implement opportunism behaviours. Of 
course, the first lies in the institutional incoherence of the transaction. By increasing 
private companies’ discount rate, this incoherence decrease future profits’ value. 
Companies are incited to implement short term strategies. Therefore, state’s interest to 
protect their property rights and enforce oil contracts is not credible from private 
companies’ perspective. The second feature of the transaction is the rent characteristic of 
the sector. Large gains expected are another incitation for oil companies to implement 
short term strategies. Then, these two features of the transaction can induce the 
emergence of a non-cooperative equilibrium. This is quite coherent with the results of the 
“subject” game theory.  
 
The second incoherence of the privatization process lies in its illegitimacy. It is 
worth to remind that privatization of oil assets took place in the middle of the nineties. 
The so-called oligarchs became the new owners of oil assets through the “Loan for 
Shares” program. Russian banks lent money to Federal state. In exchange, bankers 
received oil companies’ shares for presumably a transitional period. Because of the 
state’s inability to pay back, bankers became owners of oil companies’ shares after some 
quite opaque auctions
40. This program and oligarchs’ ownership of assets still remain 
illegitimate in Russian population’s eyes. This illegitimacy strengthens bad consequences 
of the institutional incoherence. Once again, oligarchs’ belief is that the Federal 
authorities are not able and are not incited to protect their property rights
41. 
 
The third incoherence of the Russian privatization program is the legal and 
political environment in which this process has taken place. The non-Rule of law state 
and the quite conflict-provoking relations between federal authorities, on one hand, and 
                                                 
39 Because of the bounded rationality assumption, we cannot admit the idea that a market failure induce by 
asymmetries of information will give rise to an optimal institution via agents’ negotiations. In this respect, 
J. E. Stiglitz talks about the “functionalist fallacy”. As put out by M. Rutherford, “the attempts to interpret 
rule following in maximizing term run into logical difficulties as soon as imperfect information or cognitive 
constraints are allowed to enter the picture.” See M. Rutherford (1996), Op. cit., p. 78 and J. E. Stiglitz 
(2002), “Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics”, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 92, n. 3, pp. 460-501.  
 
40 S. Guriev & A. Rachinsky (2004), “Oligarchs: the Past or the Future of Russian Capitalism?”, SSRN 
Working Paper, Social Science research Network. Downloaded on the SSRN’s website, 10/05/2005 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=579581
 
41 This may explain the turning point observed in the relationship between the authorities and the oligarchs 
at the beginning of the second V. Putin’s mandate. The first mandate has been featured by the so-called 
pact between V. Putin and the oligarchs. Mainly, they were supposed to invest their money in Russia and to 
discharge their fiscal obligations. In exchange, V. Putin commits himself to protecting their property rights. 
This pact led to a stalemate. Because of the illegitimacy of the privatization process, V. Putin’s 
commitment could not be credible.  This may explain the hardening of their relationships during the second 
V. Putin’s mandate. In this respect see J. Sapir (2007), “Quel bilan pour les années Poutine ?”, Document 
de travail du Centre d’études des modes d’industrialisation, n°07-1, Downloaded on the CEMI/EHESS 
website, 05/06/07 : http://cemi.ehess.fr/document.php?id=981
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regional power, on the other hand, are some striking elements of the Russian institutional 
environment
42. These are factors which can affect private owner’s beliefs about the 
willingness and the ability of Russian state to enforce property rights and contracts. 
Obviously, this can strengthen incentives to adopt short term strategies and opportunism 
behaviors. Here, two points are worth to stress. First, while admitting that institutional 
environment play a decisive role regarding economic institutions’ effectiveness, the view 
of institutional complementarity adopted here leads us to point another causal relation 
than the “standard approach”. We must consider that corruption cannot be viewed as a 
cause of the ineffectiveness of contracts. Rather, it must be considered as a consequence 
of the institutional incoherence of the transaction. Indeed, as this incoherence increases 
private companies’ interests for opportunism behavior; they are incited to multiply 
informal relationship with state agents to implement these strategies. This point is clearly 
made by C. G. Gaddy and B. W. Ickes
43. Similarly, our point of view regarding the 
institutional incoherence of the transaction leads us to reject the idea defended by some 
reformers at the beginning of the transition. According to them, privatization of large 
firms would permit the emergence of a powerful political constituency. These new 
owners were supposed to be interested by the emergence of the Rule of law. Then, they 
were supposed to exert a lobby over the authorities in favor of the Rule of law. A quite 
similar idea is currently stressed by P. J. Luong. According to this author, oil assets’ 
privatization is a quite effective mean for protect oil states against the “resource curse”
44. 
“Resource curse” literature tries to explain that natural resources endowment gives the 
state bad incentives for enforcing economic institutions essential to economic growth. 
Privatization of oil assets allows the emergence of a political constituency which is 
interested and strong enough to negotiate with the state appropriate institutions. In our 
opinion, it can be shown that these arguments cannot be admitted. Indeed, the 
institutional incoherence of the transaction increases private companies’ discount rate. 
Then, they can be interested by implementing short term strategies and opportunism 
behaviours. This is easier in a non-Rule of law environment. Consequently, they can be 




                                                 
42 In respect of the conflict-provoking relations between Federal and Regional powers, see V. Kryukov & 
A. Moe (1998), “Joint Management of Oil and Gas resources in Russia”, Post-Soviet Geography and 
Economics, Vol. 39, n. 7, pp. 588-605. 
 
43 C. G. Gaddy & B. W. Ickes (2005), Op. cit. 
44 J. P. Luong (2004), “Rethinking the Resource Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutional Capacity”, 
Paper presented to the Conference on Globalization and Self Determination, Yale University, 14-15 May 
2004. 
 
45 Regarding oligarchs’ rent seeking strategies and their interests in prolonging the absence of the Rule of 
law, see B. Black, R. Kraakman & A. Tarassova (2000), «  Russian Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong ? », Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52 and K. Hoff & J. E. Stiglitz (2002), 
“After the Big Bang ? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies”, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, n. 2934.  
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In short, a game theory perspective of institutional complementarity leads us to 
consider three incoherencies of the Russian oil industry privatization. These can explain 
the current ineffectiveness of economics institutions in the Russian oil sector without 
blaming only the Russian institutional environment.  The first is that Russian model 
which emerges from privatization belongs to the “incoherent proprietorial model”. 
Private property rights on oil assets cannot be effective. Consequently, this can lead 
private companies to implement short term strategies and opportunism behaviour. 
Second, the illegitimacy of oil assets’ privatization in Russia strengthens these negative 
consequences. The non-Rule of Law state in which the privatization took place constitutes 
the third inconsistency. It was far from certain that new owners will lobby authorities for 
ensuring the emergence of the Rule of raw.  
 
 
III.  A Comparative Analysis of Oil Contracts: The National Oil Company 
as a Complementary Arrangement of Oil Contracts. 
 
While an institutional analysis allows us to highlight the incoherance of the Russian 
oil industry privatization, it remains to consider the relevence of the current 
reorganization. Does this reorganization can be an arrangement allowing to overcome 
contradictions inherited from the privatization program? Does this reorganization can 
allow a change in incentives faced by private companies for lead them to implement a 
more balanced resource management of resources? In short, does this reorganization can 
allow the effectiveness of economic institutions?  Today, the first stake for the Russian 
authorities is to ensure the credibility of its commitment to protect private companies’ 
property rights, including their right to access oil resources. This is the condition for 
inducing private oil companies to invest in the exploration of marginal fields, notably in 
East Siberia. In accordance, with the game theory perspective of the institutional 
complementarity, this credibility required that oil companies believe that it is the state’s 
interest to protect their rights. The point is then to bring in light how the state could incite 
private companies to manage their resources according to its own interest. The second 
stake is to highlight how the State can control private companies’ activities. Indeed, 
because of the institutional incoherence of the transaction and because of the rent 
characteristic of the sector, private companies can have interests to cheat and implement 
an opportunism behaviour regarding oil contracts. It can appear relevant to lead a 
comparative analysis of oil contracts in order to see what are the arrangements apt to 
achieve these two objectives. This analysis would highlight the tension existing between 
these two objectives. Contractual arrangements which induce good incentives for oil 
companies are those which lead to an increase in the control costs borne by the state
46.  
This analysis addresses first the fiscal aspects of oil contracts (A). Then, the comparative 
analysis focuses on the two main leasing systems currently implemented, i.e. license 
system and production-sharing agreements (B).  
                                                 
46 The idea that the implementation of contractual arrangements giving appropriate incentives goes hand in 
hand with an increase in ex post control costs is not new and quite widespread in NEI works. For example, 
this tension has been formalized by P. Bajari & S. Tadelis (2001), “Incentive Versus Transaction Costs: A 
Theory of Procurement Contracts”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, n. 3, pp. 387-407. 
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A.  Fiscal Devices 
 
No doubt, the two partners are quite attentive to fiscal arrangements of oil contracts. 
Because they determine the sharing of the benefits’ projects of course but also because 
fiscal arrangements are devices for the state to regulate private companies’ activities. 
Fiscal aspects of oil contracts are essential for disciplining private companies’ strategies 
regarding exploration and ressources management. Following the UNCTAD’s 
classification, it is possible to distinguish three types of fiscal devices
47. Each one 
induces different incentives for private oil companies. The first type is made up by 
progressive fiscal devices. They are liberal fiscal devices according to B. Mommer’s 
classification, i.e. they aim at collecting only oil rent. And, most of economics works are 
agree that here lies the crieria for assessing the efficiency of a fiscal arrangement. All 
collecting devices that do not tax companies’ excess profits induce bad incentives for 
operators. According to the UNCTAD’s classification, these bad fiscal arrangements 
include neutral and regressive devices. They are devices which are made up by tax on the 
volume or the value of production, i.e. royalties, bonus bid, export duty and so on. 
 
Regarding the highly problematic incentives resulting from the implementation of 
neutral and regressive devices, four problems are usually stressed. First, it is no more 
profitable for companies to explore and develop marginal fields characterized by high 
production costs. Indeed, taxing the volume or the value of production implies an 
increase in production costs. Then, some deposits which otherwise are profitable can be 
pushed into the non-profitable category
48. Second, companies are incitated to abandon 
the develoment of fields prematurely; without extracting resources which are the most 
difficult to recover
49. The “Prudhoe Bay Effect” is the third negative consequence. 
Because the state cannot collect extra profits by relying to a tax on the volume of the 
production, he is likely to increase ex post the tax rate. This ex post change can affect 
companies’ beliefs regarding risk. Consequently, they are likely to raise their discount 
rate and postpone their exploration activities
50. Lastly, this state’s inability to collect 
excess profits could induce private companies to increase their depletion rate, to acclerate 
the extraction path of ressources. This is because private companies collect the majority 
part of the excess profit.  
 
In order to overcome these problems, a tax aiming at collect the oil rent appears 
efficient. In order to achieve that, government take must vary according to the evolution 
of production costs on one hand and according to oil prices on the other hand. Then, for 
                                                 
47 UNCTAD (1995), Administration of Fiscal Regimes for Petroleum Exploration and Development, 
UNCTAD, Geneva. 
 
48 R. Boadway & F. Flatters (1993), Op. cit. 
 
49 W. J. Mead (1994), “Toward an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System”, The Energy Journal, Vol. 15, n. 
4, pp. 1- 18. 
 
50 R. Garnault & A. C. Ross (1975), “Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and the Taxing of Natural Resources”, 
The Economic Journal, Vol. 85, pp. 272-285.   18
progressive fiscal devices to be effective, the state must be able to control the volume of 
output, production costs and sell prices. Otherwise, the risk is to see private companies 
use their private information for an effective tax evasion. Conversely, neutral and 
regressive fiscal devices have some comparative advantages. To be effective, surveillance 
costs are very low. For example, a flat royalty rate on production requires to be effective 
only the control of the production volume. Here lies the first argument for supporting the 
idea of a tension between the two main objectives of oil contracts. Fiscal arrangements 
which induce good incentives for private companies also induce high transaction costs 
borne by the state. The following table highlights this tension.  
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Bonus   Unnecessary Unnecessary Unnecessary Regressive 
Export Duty  Necessary Unnecessary  Unnecessary Regressive 
        
Flat rate on profits  Necessary Necessary Necessary  Neutral 
Ressource Rent 
Tax  
Necessary Necessary Necessary  Progressive 
 
B.  Licenses VS Production-Sharing Agreement 
 
Two lease systems are usually implemented by oil states to regulatate upstream 
activites. The first one is the license system. As mentionned before, licenses are permits 
assign to private companies authorizing them to carry on exploration and production 
activites. Among other issues, licenses deal with the lengh of the lease, the area, the work 
commitment and so on. Production-sharing agreements are works contracts. They are 
usually implemented in developing countries
51. According to the majority of authors, no 
                                                 
51 For a presentation of oil contracts’ main features, see: P.D. Cameron (1988), «  The Structure of 
Petroleum Agreements », in Beredjick Nicky & Wälde Thomas [ed.], Petroleum Investment Policies in 
Developing Countries, Graham and Trotman, UK, pp. 29-46, B. Taverne (1994), An Introduction to the 
Regulation of the Petroleum Industry. Laws, Contracts and Conventions, International Energy and 
Resources Laws and Policy Series, Graham & Trotman, London and A. Jennings (2002), Oil and Gas 
Exploration Contrats, Sweet & Maxwell, Londres. 
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strong differences are worhwile to mentionned. For example, T. Waëlde stresses that 
“main functions of an agreement (…) are largely independent of the legal form”
52. 
Similarly, D. Johnston’s comparison of agreements’ fiscal aspects leads to the conclusion 
that the “terminology is effectively distinct but these two systems are not really different 
from a financial point of view.
53” 
 
It is obvious that licences and production-sharing contracts share some common 
features regarding arrangements aiming at control and discipline private companies’ 
incentives. Among these basic arrangements, we can notice the following. First, licences 
and production-sharing agreements both specify some compulsory works, i.e. exploration 
works that operators have to carry on. This disposition can ensure the state that oil 
companies will not accumulate licenses without exploring the area. Basically, 
arrangements regarding compulsory relinquishments aim at the same target. Companies 
must relinquish a part of the area. The state can ensure that companies are really 
interested to carry on exploration and production into the area that they keep. More, the 
state can assign to another company relinquished area.  
 
Despite these common features, it can be pointed out some differences between 
license and PSA regarding the objectives of disciplining companies’ incentives and 
controlling their activities. The main difference which is worthwhile to stress concerns 
the transfer of property rights over oil resources. Basically, an operator holding a license 
becomes the owner of oil resources once they are extracted. Conversely, such transfer of 
property rights does not take place if the state and the operator sign a PSA. The state 
remains the owner of oil production. The operator is paid via the “Profit Oil” mechanism: 
oil output is split between the state and the operator according to a percentage specified 
into the agreement. This fiscal device is quite regressive. Indeed, “Profit Oil” mechanism 
is likely to induce for the operator the same bad incentives than a tax on the value/volume 
of production. Conversely, it seems easier for the state to specify progressive fiscal 
arrangements by issuing licences. As the operator becomes the owners of resources once 
they are produced, state’s remuneration is effective via the ex post taxation of oil 
companies. Consequently, the state is able to implement some progressive fiscal devices. 
Then, a license system is more apt to offer good incentives to private companies than the 
PSA’s one. This is because the main fiscal device of PSAs lies in the “Profit Oil” 
mechanism which is regressive. 
 
Inversely, it is probably easier for the state to control companies via a PSA than via 
the licenses’ system. By signing a PSA, the state becomes a contractual partner of the 
operator. Via the minister or its national oil company, the state can be involved for 
making some important decisions during a project. Conversely, the state is not directly 
involved and it may be harder for him to control operators’ activities via the license 
                                                 
52 T. Waëlde (1988), ”Investment Policies in the International Petroleum Industry-Responses to the Current 
Crisis”, in N. Beredjick & T. Waëlde [Eds], Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing Countries, 
Graham and trotman, UK, p. 13. 
 
53 D. Johnston (1994), International Petroleum Systems and Production Sharing Contracts, Penwell, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. 
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system. As put by the UNCTAD, this control necessarily takes place “after the facts”
54. 
Then, it seems possible to conclude that license system can offer the state the possibility 
to implement some progressive fiscal devices. But, for these good arrangements to be 
effective, the state must be able to control effectively operators’ activities ex post, 
without be involved for making important decisions. On the contrary, it seems easier for 
the state to control companies’ operation by signing a PSA. But, the “Profit Oil” 
mechanism is quite regressive. It is tougher for the state to offer private companies good 
incentives. 
 
This quick comparative analysis brings into light the tension between the two 
objectives of oil contracts. Contractual arrangements which allow the state to discipline 
private companies’ incentives induce high ex post costs of control. Here lies the main 
argument for sustaining the idea that the presence of a state-controlled company is a 
complementary arrangement to oil contracts. By decreasing ex post transaction costs, this 
arrangement can ensure the effectiveness of ex ante contractual arrangements aiming at 
offer good incentives to oil companies. By ensuring the effectiveness of oil contracts, a 
state-controlled company can be an organizational arrangement allowing the delegation 
of upstream activities to private companies in large scale.  
 
This last assessment is particularly worthwhile for Russia. At the present time, high 
ex post costs of control prevent the effectiveness of ex ante contractual arrangements. In 
this respect, the observation of the evolution of Russian fiscal devices is striking
55. Since 
the beginning of the transition, progressive fiscal devices have been substituted for more 
regressive ones. During the first years of the transition, some fiscal devices as the excises 
on oil or royalties were flexible enough to offer good incentives. Since then, most of the 
changes introduced in the Russian fiscal scheme have increased the relative importance 
of regressive devices. The most important reform has occurred in the beginning of 2002 
when mineral extraction tax was introduced to take over from several other taxes. This 
tax is based upon the value of each company’s production. Then, total government take 
does not vary according production costs. This is highly problematic and explains why 
Russian companies call at the government to introduce tax breaks for the development of 
marginal fields. In accordance with the tension highlighted here, it seems possible to 
follow L. Dienes who stresses that this trend can be explained by the authorities’ 
difficulties to control effectively profits’ companies
56. The state cannot ensure the 
effectiveness of progressive fiscal devices. Federal authorities have chosen to rely on 
regressive devices which require less ex post control to be effective. Therefore, the 
presence of a state-controlled company beside private ones could diminish control costs 
and consequently allowing the effectiveness of better fiscal devices. We can notice that 
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55 International Energy Agency (2002), Op. Cit. , B. Bosquet (2002), “The Role of Natural Resources in 
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the difficulties of the federal authorities to control ex post companies’ activities are 
reinforced by their conflicting relations with regional power. In a majority of cases, it 
seems that informal relations between regional power and private companies have been 
tied against the federal authorities. This is another argument in support of the current 
reorganisation’s coherence.  
 
 




If we accept the idea that national oil company can be a complementary 
arrangement to oil contracts, two important problems must be addressed. First, it cannot 
be forgotten that the main normative conclusion of the property right theory is that public 
property rights on assets are inefficient. This is because a public firm’s manager faces 
bad incentives to manage the asset.  While he controls the assets, he is not the residual 
claimant of profit. This seperation between control and ownership induces bad incentives. 
Public firm’s manager is not motivated to take any action that will increase the asset’s 
value. He can have in minds other goal than the maximization of profit.  More, the 
observation of the links between different state-controlled companies and their 
government owners leads B. Mommer to consider that the main risk is that the national 
oil company represents the private oil industry’s interests, and not the state’s ones
57. 
Then following O. Nøreing, we have to take into account that national oil companies’ 
managers “are not agents, subjects to a total control from the government but some 




  In this perspective, the ability of the state to control and discipline its national 
company appears as an essential condition for this organizational arrangement being 
effective. Once again, the effectiveness of this arrangement depends upon the subjective 
beliefs of private companies regarding national companies’ interests. Private companies’ 
beliefs may be that the rules imposed by the state to the national oil company are in 
contradiction with the national company’s interests. Then, the ability of the state to 
control their activities via this arrangement does not appear credible from the point of 
view of private companies. Consequently, even a state company-led consortium can 
implement a strategy of defection regarding state’s interests for the management of 
resources. Therefore, private companies’ subjective beliefs are that state’s interest is not 
to secure their rights of access to the resource. This can strengthened private companies’ 
incentives to implement short term strategies and to be opportunist regarding oil 
contracts. In this respect, partial privatization of Gazprom and Rosneft can appear 
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problematic. Indeed, private companies’ beliefs may be that national oil companies’ 
interests are the same than privates’ ones.  
 
  Arrangements allowing the Russian authorities to control national oil companies 
are essential for ensuring the effectiveness of the current reorganization. In our view, here 
lies the main problem which will be faced by the Russian authorities. On short-term, the 
current informal and personal links between authorities and national oil companies’ 
managers may be effective to ensure that control. But clearly, this will be ineffective on a 
longer run because this control is not institutionalised and too much sensitive to political 
economics issues. The stake is then to institutionalize the links between national oil 
companies and the authorities. Then, it is necessary to address this question and highlight 
which formal mechanisms could be implemented for ensuring an adequate and more 
formal control of national oil companies.  To achieve this objective, it appears pertinent 
to briefly analyze the Norwegian model. Three reasons justify this choice. First, while the 
Norwegian authorities made quickly clear their intention to make effective their property 
rights on oil resources, they chose to delegate upstream activities to private companies for 
a large part. Then, Norwegian model belong to the “incoherent proprietorial” type. 
Second, it seems that Norway has managed to overcome problems resulting from the 
institutional incoherence on wich is based the transaction. It seems possible to show that 
Norway’s authorities have been quite effective for controlling and disciplining private 
companies in order to make them respect its interests regarding the management of oil 
resources. Despite the institutional incoherence, the Norwegian authorities have been able 
to induce oil consortium to implement a moderate rate of extraction in accordance with 
the objective quickly stressed on official documents. Lastly, an important role has been 
given to national oil companies for controlling private activities. As soon as the 
beginning of the seventies, the state introduces into its petroleum legislation a provision 
giving Statoil a minimum of 50% stake in all petroleum consortium. Here, the stake is to 
highlight the original arrangements of the Norwegian model allowing the state to ensure 
the credibility of the Statoil’s role of control. In this respect, J. M Chevalier stresses that 




  Basically, three important lessons from the observation of the Norwegian model 
can be stressed. First, it is obvious that the control over Statoil by the Norwegian 
authorities is strict and quite formal. This control is carried out through Storting and 
Minister’s approbation of all important decisions make by Statoil. As mentioned before, 
this control is not so strict in Russia and very less formal. Second, as soon as 1982, a 
commission is mandated for thinking about a reorganization of the state’s involvement in 
the oil industry. The objective is clearly to limit the financial growth of Statoil for 
avoiding the national oil company to become a too powerful political constituency
60. The 
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introduction of the State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) is the original arrangement 
introduced by the Norway for achieving that goal. In accordance with this mechanism, all 
Statoil’s stakes in oil licenses are divided and one part is attributed to the State. Then, the 
Norwegian state is currently a stakeholder in all licences. This confirms the difficulty to 
control the national oil company by some indirect means. Indeed, even with an 
institutional environment very less opaque than Russian one, Norwegian state has chosen 
to be directly involved in oil consortiums. This stress how problematic the control of 
Gazprom and Rosneft will be in Russia and raises the question of the pertinence of 
implementing a mechanism closed to the SDFI.  
 
The third lesson lies in the fact that the Norwegian model tends to confirm that 
this direct state involvement is the striking arrangement allowing the authorities to 
overcome problems induced by the institutional incoherence of the transaction. This 
involvement has increased the credibility of the state’s ability to control consortium’s 
operations. Statoil-led consortium’s subjective beliefs lie in the ability of the State to 
control operations regarding resources management, production costs and so on. Then, 
contract arrangements aiming at discipline their incentives have been effective. 
Especially, fiscal devices have become more and more progressive. Consortiums have 
sufficient incentives to implement a quite balanced resource management strategy. The 
important point to note is that the Norwegian state has never used its right of vote
61. This 
means that consortiums’ respect of the state’s interests is self-enforcing. Knowing the 
capacity of the State to control effectively their operations, consortiums’ subjective 
beliefs are that it is in their interest to take into account state’s prerogatives. In this 
perspective, their subjective beliefs are also that the state has an interest to protect their 
property rights over oil assets and their rights regarding access to oil resources. 
Consequently, the state’s commitment to protect their rights is credible from the oil 
companies’ point of view. Private property rights and oil contracts are then self-enforcing 
and they can ensure their functional role of decreasing uncertainty and induce efficient 
use of resources. In this respect, it is worthwhile to note than none licences have ever 
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**** 
   
  This  article  supports  the  idea that the current reorganization of the Russian oil 
industry is not a mere re-nationalization of oil assets explained by short-term political 
objectives. Current situation of the Russian oil industry is hardly sustainable. While we 
observe a maximisation of the production from old field, insufficient investments are 
carrying on for the replenishment of resources. By relying on a neo-institutional 
perspective, we have tried to explain this result by the ineffectiveness of economics 
institutions. Property rights on oil assets and oil contracts are not effective and do not 
ensure their functional role in economic coordination. Afterward, this article focused on 
the possible explanations of this ineffectiveness. All works which explain this 
ineffectiveness by only blaming the Russian institutional environment cannot be totally 
convincing. That is because of the theoretical inconsistencies on which they are based. In 
order to overcome these inconsistencies, we have to stress another view of institutional 
complementarity by relying on M. Aoki and A. Greif’s works. A game theory perspective 
of institutions leads us to build a classification of oil model and to highlight the 
incoherence of the Russian’s one. This incoherence lies mainly on the contradiction 
which exists between private property rights on oil assets on one hand and public 
property rights on oil resources, on the other hand. Private property rights on oil assets 
are necessarily attenuated. Consequently, private companies face bad incentives when 
implementing their resource management strategies. This is what we call the institutional 
incoherence of the transaction. For the state to overcome this contradiction, it must be 
able to ensure the effectiveness of ex ante contractual arrangements which aim at 
disciplining companies’ incentives. A comparative analysis of these arrangements brings 
in light that good contractual arrangements go hand in hand with an increase of ex post 
control costs. In our opinion, that is why the involvement of a state-controlled company 
into private consortiums is a complementary arrangement to oil contracts. Under some 
restrictions, this could be an arrangement overcoming the institutional incoherence of the 
transaction and then allowing the delegation of oil upstream activities to private 
companies. In this respect, we can agree with P. Noël’s analysis of the recent Shtokman 
deal passed between Gazprom and Total
62. This deal may be a new investment model in 
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